Here, I’m sharing information on published and forthcoming papers, papers under review as well as on a conference/anthology I’m currently planning with my colleague Gal Katz.

Published and Forthcoming Papers


Forthcoming in Handbuch Kantianismus, Metzler Verlag


Forthcoming in Praktische Philosophie nach Kant, ed. Jörg Noller

Hegel on the Value of the Market Economy

European Journal of Philosophy 26 no. 4: 1283-1296 | Link

Abstract. It is widely known that Hegel is a proponent and defender of the market economy. But why exactly does Hegel think that the market economy is superior to other economic systems ? In this paper, I argue that Hegel’s answer to this question has not been sufficiently understood. Commentators, or so I want to claim, have only identified one part of Hegel’s argument – but have left out the most original and surprising dimension of his view: namely Hegel’s conviction that we should embrace the market economy for its educational impact. Indeed, Hegel thinks that the market, by creating a sphere of life apart from traditional norms and expectations, teaches us something about ourselves, about others and about the world we inhabit together – something that we could not learn anywhere else, but that we inevitably need to live well as individuals.

The Moral Turn in Kant's Philosophy of History 

Philosophisches Jahrbuch 125 no. 1: 2-19 | Link

Abstract: In this paper, I argue that Kant’s philosophy of history underwent a significant change between his 1784 Idea for a Universal History and his 1790 Third Critique. My proposal is that in between these two texts Kant decisively revised his conception of the sources of historical, i.e. cultural and political, progress: In 1784, he conceived of historical progress as primarily accomplished through social antagonism among human beings, whereas beginning in 1790, he elevates ethical cooperation into a second, significant source of progress. Between 1784 and the 1790s, in other words, Kant re-conceived the collaboration between moral agents as a driving force of history and of the progressing cultivation of humankind. In this paper I offer evidence for this change and suggest reasons why it might have occurred.

Schelling on Time and Agency in the Freiheitsschrift and the Weltalter

Forthcoming in a collection on Schelling’s Philosophy of Freedom, ed. by Thomas Buchheim

Abstract. In his 1811 Weltalter, Schelling, for the first time in his philosophical career, confronts the reader with a stunning claim: time, he argues here, is not the all-encompassing medium in which all human (and divine) actions and interactions take place – rather, time is generated by agents through the decisions they make. In this paper, I investigate what motivated Schelling to develop this heterodox and consciously counter-intuitive view. I argue that Schelling was driven to develop it out of a desire to preserve the possibility of human freedom. Indeed, I argue that there are good arguments that, already in his so-called Freiheitsschrift of 1809, Schelling had come to believe that human freedom, in order to be possible, required time to be very different from how we ordinarily conceive of it. His heterodox view of time, then, appears to be intended as a direct response to this realization – as an attempt to show that time indeed had this unconventional structure and was, hence, ‘fit for human freedom’.

Schellings Freiheitsschrift als systembildende Pragmatie. Zur Methode der Untersuchung im Kontrast mit Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes.

Co-authored w/ Thomas Frisch and Nora Wachsmann, In Wozu Metaphysik?, ed. by Christopher Erhard et al. | Link

Abstract: In 1807 Hegel publishes his Phenomenology, in which he prominently presents a new philosophical methodology. Only two years later, and after reading crucial parts of the Phenomenology, Hegel’s former friend Schelling equally presents new philosophical methodology in his 1809 Freiheitsschrift. This begs an obvious, but only rarely asked, question: is Schelling’s new method influenced by Hegel’s new method ? In this paper, we argue that the answer is ‘Yes’. Schelling is indeed influenced by Hegel and even takes over central methodological insights from the Phenomenology. But he is also critical of Hegel’s method and tries to present a better alternative: a critique, or so we claim, that prefigures some of Schelling’s well-known later criticisms of Hegel and his distinction between ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ philosophy.

Disposition / Gesinnung

Forthcoming in Cambridge Kant Lexicon, ed. Julian Wuerth et al.

Sociability / Geselligkeit

Forthcoming in Cambridge Kant Lexicon, ed. Julian Wuerth et al.

Revise and Resubmit

Title Omitted [on issues in Hegel’s economic theory] (10.500 words)

Papers under Review

Title Omitted [on social critique] (10.700 words)


Hegel’s Legacy: First Nature in Social Philosophy

Co-Organized with my colleague Gal Katz, October 2020

Abstract. While recent years have seen an enhanced interest in Hegel's conception of "second nature", we believe that there are reasons to go beyond the widespread fascination with this Aristotelian concept. A key idea that we wish to explore in the conference is that the goodness or rationality of second nature—including its remaining “alive”, as it were—depends on the extent to which it retains sufficient grounding in first nature: in our biological desires and drives. Indeed, it seems that on Hegel’s view, modern Sittlichkeit owes its supreme rationality, goodness and freedom to the fact that it incorporates and gives outlet to human properties that are rooted in first nature. Any habituated second nature that suppresses such first nature properties risks ethical corruption and ossification (as was the fate of ancient Sittlichkeit, on Hegel’s diagnosis).

Our conference, hence, aims at a reevaluation of the role that first nature plays in Hegel’s social theory. Since such a reevaluation always should go beyond the confines of historically-focused Hegel scholarship, we explicitly also want to probe his views for their contemporary significance: indeed, his commitment to first nature as a norm—for evaluating, critiquing and designing social institutions—seems highly pertinent to social theory today (and finds echoes in authors such as Marcuse or Fromm). A wide range of present day ethical problems with a “material substrate” can, or so it appears, be understood in terms of failing the norm of sufficient grounding in first nature—e.g., the proliferation of depression and anxiety in developed societies, the decline in sexual intimacy in the United States, even the environmental crisis.